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ODOM v. FORD AND THE PRIVITY
REQUIREMENT IN SOUTH CAROLINA
Privity of Contract: an Essential Element
of an Implied Warranty Action
About ten years ago, Barley Odom, a Darlington farmer, won
a case in the county court against the Ford Motor Company, and
Ford appealed. The question presented by that appeal was
whether Odom, who had purchased an allegedly defective trac-
tor1 from a local retailer, should be allowed to maintain an
implied warranty action2 against the Ford Motor Company with
whom he had no contractual relation.
The court reversed and held that lack of privity of contract
was a bar to an action based upon an implied warranty.3 Recov-
ery was thus denied Odom because he had no contractual relation
with the Ford Motor Company 4 ; his contract had been with the
retailer only.
The Odom decision aligns South Carolina with the majority
of jurisdictions.5 The definite trend, however, is in the other
1. Odom alleged that the tractor had failed to perform properly, causing
him additional expense in his farming operation.
2. Plaintiff's complaint was based on both an oral express warranty which
plaintiff claimed the retailer as agent of Ford had made and on an implied
warranty that the tractor was suitable for agricultural purposes. Following
defendant's motion to require him to elect plaintiff chose to proceed on the
implied warranty.
3. Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956).
4. Plaintiff contended that Ford's advertising pamphlets established the
requisite privity; Judge Oxner dismissed this contention by pointing out,
There are cases where recovery has been allowed on the theory of express
warranty without a showing of privity.... But the instant action was
neither brought nor tried on this theory.
Id. at 328, 95 S.E. 2d at 604.
5. Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961); Crystal
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 837 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d 1094 (1957) ; Drury
v. Armour & Co., 140 Ark. 371, 216 S.W. 40 (1919); Ciociola v. Delaware
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 53 Del. 477, 172 A.2d 252 (1961); Revlon v. Mur-
dock, 103 Ga. App. 842, 120 S.E.2d 912 (1961) ; Schultz v. Tecumseh Products,
310 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1962) ; Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 316
(1943) ; Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946); Grey
v. Hayes-Sammons Chemical Co., 310 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1962); Larson
v. U. S. Rubber Co., 163 F. Supp. 327 (D. Mont 1958); Long v. Flanigan
Warehouse, 79 Nev. 241, 882 P.2d 399 (1963); Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942) ; Alexander Funeral Home, Inc.
v. Pride, 26 N.C. 723, 136 S.E.2d 120 (1964); Wood v. Advance Rumely
Thresher Co., 60 N.D. 384, 234 N.W. 517 (1931); Inglis v. American Motors,
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direction, and a rapidly increasing number of states have dis-
carded the privity requirement altogether.6 The question is:
Will South Carolina follow this trend or will South Carolina
follow Odom?
A recent case7 allowing an action for the wrongful death of
an unborn viable fetus indicates the court's inclination to follow
a modern trend, but many cases show that stare decisis is still
powerful."
The Contract Action and the Tort Action: Burdens of Proof.
Unfortunately the field of warranty liability is not as clear as
it might be. Confusion has resulted in some cases from termi-
nology, in others from misunderstanding.
A warranty, of course, may be express9 or implied1 ; the im-
plied warranty arises by operation of law at the sale of goods
and usually means that the goods will be generally fit for or-
dinary purposes." If the goods are not fit the warranty is
breached, and all damages flowing naturally from the breach,
12
such as damages for personal injury,'3 may be recovered by the
purchaser.
94 Abs. 438, 197 N.E.2d 921 (1964); Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409
Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963); Russo v. Merck, 138 F. Supp. 147 (D.R.I.
1956) ; Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956) ; White-
horn v. Nash-Finch Co., 67 S.D. 465, 293 N.W. 859 (1940) ; Brown v. Howard,
285 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Harris v. Hampton Roads Tractor &
Equipment Co., 202 Va. 958, 121 S.E.2d 471 (1961) ; Burgess v. Sanitary Meat
Market, 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785 (1939), and Barlow v. DeVilbiss, 214
F. Supp. 540 (E. D. Wis. 1963). Research has failed to discover cases in
Alaska, Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Wyoming and Utah.
6. California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey,
New York, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont have dispensed with
privity in warranty actions.
7. Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964), 16 S.C.L. REv.
439 (1964).
8. Hampton v. M'Connel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818); Alexander v.
Hunnicut, 196 S.C. 364, 13 S.E.2d 630 (1941) ;Patrick v. Maybank, 198 S.C.
262, 17 S.E.2d 530 (1939): State v. Williams, 13 S.C. 546 (1880).
9. Herndon v. Southern Pest Control Co., 307 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1962);
Iler v. Jennings, 87 S.C. 87, 68 S.E. 1041 (1909) ; Robson v. Miller, 12 S.C.
586 (1879) ; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315; UNIFOnr SALES AcT § 12;
WILLISTON, SALES §§ 195, 196 (2d ed. 1924).
10. Bond Bros. Cash & Delivery Grocery v. Claussen's Bakeries, Inc., 184
S.C. 95, 191 S.E. 717 (1937); Annot., 113 A.L.R. 675 (1938).
11. Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Coclin, 161 S.C. 40, 159 S.E. 461 (1931) ; Walker,
Evans & Cogswell Co. v. Ayer, 80 S.C. 292, 61 S.E. 557 (1908); UNIFCRm
CoMMEcrAL CODE § 2-314; Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable
Quality, 27 MiNN. L. REv. 117 (1943).
12. National Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hoover, 128 S.C. 344, 122 S.E. 858
(1924).
13. Ellis v. Montgomery & Crawford, Inc., 189 S.C. 72, 200 S.E. 82 (1938).
[Vol. I'[
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The problem comes up, as in Odom, when a purchaser from the
retailer attempts to sue the manufacturer in implied warranty.
Most courts view the implied warranty as a promise or contract
made by the seller to the buyer,14 and therefore, allow only the
immediate buyer to sue upon the warranty. To allow someone
not the recipient of the warranty to sue would, in Lord Abinger's
-words, cause "the most absurd consequences to which I can see
no limit."' 5 The privity gap between manufacturer and pur-
chaser from retailer is thus fatal to a cause of action in implied
warranty in most states today.16 These states see a tort action as
the proper remedy for the out-of-privity plaintiff-7; they see
fault as the basis of liability and refuse to extend warranty lia-
bility to one who was not a party to the contract of sale.
A comparison of the burdens of proof in tort and contract
actions points up an interesting aspect of the privity problem.
In a tort products liability action the plaintiff must show (1)
his injury, (2) that the defendant's product was the proximate
cause of his injury, and (3) that the defendant was negligent in
the manufacture of the injury-causing product.'8 In a warranty
action plaintiff need only prove injury, causation, and the exist-
ence of the injury-causing defect in the product when it left the
defendant's control.19 In a tort action the plaintiff may have
difficulty in establishing the defendant's negligence, particularly
in view of the complexity of manufacturing processes. In most
states the plaintiff has the tool of res ipsa loquitor at his dis-
posal,20 but the defendant can show the use of all reasonable
care in his manufacturing and testing procedures and thus rebut
14. VOLD, SALES § 84 (2d ed. 1959); 3 WiLmsToN, CONTRACTS § 673 (rev.
ed. 1936) ; 77 CJ.S. Sales § 302(c) (1952).
15. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M.&W. 109, 114, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405
(1842).
16. This gap exists in the case of the retailer between the retailer and any
person who is not a purchaser from him. The gap, wherever it exists, is the
privity problem and statements made about privity are generally applicable to
retailer and manufacturer alike.
17. Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 326, 95 S.E.2d 601, 604 (1956).
18. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 28 (1938); Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel of
Privity, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1114 (1960).
19. Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. Mun.
App. 1962); Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109
N.W.2d 918 (1961); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability without Fault and
the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 855 (1963).
20. South Carolina does not subscribe to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor
by name, but in bailment cases the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case
if he shows delivery in good condition and return in damaged condition. 1
S.C.L.Q. 290 (1948); Shoreland Freezers, Inc. v. Textile Ice and Fuel Co.,
241 S.C. 537, 129 S.E.2d 424 (1963); Gilland v. Peter's Dry Cleaning Co.,
195 S.C. 417, 11 S.E.2d 857 (1940) ; 38 Am. Jua. Negligence § 295-312 (1941).
1965]
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any inference of negligence on his part. In light of this, the
reason for the clamor for the abrogation of the privity require-
ment becomes apparent: if privity is not required plaintiff can
sue in warranty and not be required to prove negligence. If
privity is done away with, manufacturers become liable in war-
ranty to remote vendees even though they used all possible care
in the production of their goods.
Warranty liability is thus strict liability because once privity
has been eliminated as a defense, manufacturers become strictly
liable for injury caused by their products regardless of lack of
contractual relation with the injured party and regardless of
freedom from fault in the manufacture of the product.
21
Strict liability should not be confused with "absolute lia-
bility"22 which is presently imposed only on those who engage
in some ultra-hazardous activity such as blasting. Persons en-
gaged in such activity are absolutely liable for the harm they
cause, regardless of the precautions they take. Strict products
liability, on the other hand, requires the plaintiff to prove a
defect in the injury-causing product when it left defendant's
control.
The key to the difference between the contract and tort ac-
tions for product-caused injury lies in the difference in the
burden of proof required for each; in a tort action the plaintiff
must go one step further than he must go in a contract action
and show that the defendant's negligence caused the defect which
caused the injury. The advocates of dispensing with privity are
thus advocates of dispensing with the proof of negligence in
products liability cases. There is the difference; there is what
the fight is about. The lines are drawn; the battle rages. Which
side will South Carolina take?
History and Development: the privity requirement
Although all states recognize the right of action in tort against
the manufacturer of an injury-causing product,23 this recogni-
21. A breach of warranty, it is now clear, is not only a violation of the sales
contract out of which the warranty arises but is a tortious wrong suable
by a non-contracting party whose use of the warranted article is within
the reasonable contemplation of the .. . manufacturer.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 879
(Sup. Ct. 1962) ; Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 433,
191 N.E.2d 81, 82 (Ct. App. 1963) ; Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Manu-
facturing Co., 80 N.J. Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275 (App. Div. 1963); James,
General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence, 24
TErNN. L. Ray. 923 (1957).
22. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 519 (1938).
23. Id. § 395; PRossER, TORTS § 96 (3d ed. 1964).
[Vol. 17
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tion is a fairly recent development. A brief look at history will
show how this came about.
Lord Abinger indulged in dicta in Winterbottom, v. WFright,2 4
and was understood to say that lack of privity was a bar to both
contract and tort actions. In Winterbottom, a mailcoach driver
who was injured when his coach collapsed sued the man respon-
sible for keeping the coaches in proper condition. The defendant
was under contract with the postmaster to maintain the coaches.
The English court disallowed the suit because the plaintiff was
not in contractual relation with the defendant; they said it
would be unjust to allow a third party to come along and rip
open the contract with a law suit after the parties to the con-
tract had settled everything to their satisfaction. This result
was accepted in England and America, and courts refused the
right of action in tort and contract by anyone not in privity
with the defendant.25
This was quickly seen to be unsatisfactory in tort actions.
The rule which disallowed a tort action because of lack of privity
of contract became riddled with exceptions,2 6 the most important
being that if the product was "inherently" dangerous, then plain-
tiff could sue in tort even though he was not in privity. This
exception was first stated in the case of Thomas v. Winchester,27
in which plaintiff was injured because defendant, a druggist,
had mislabelled a bottle of poison. However, deciding what prod-
ucts were inherently dangerous gave the courts difficulty, and
classifications of various products added to the confusion.28
In 1916, Judge Cardozo caused the exception to swallow the
general rule of non-liability in the celebrated case of MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co. 2 9 MacPherson, "an improvident Scot who
squandered his gold on a Buick automobile," 30 was hurt when
24. 10 M.&W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
25. PRossER, TORTS § 96 (3d ed. 1964).
26. Three general exceptions have been noted: (1) If the seller knew the
chattel was dangerous for its intended use and failed to tell this to the buyer he
became liable on the basis of something like fraud; (2) If the product was
furnished for use on the defendant's premises the user was treated as an in-
vitee; (3) If the product was "inherently" dangerous to human safety the
manufacturer was held liable. PRossER, TORTS § 96 (3d ed. 1964).
27. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
28. Compare Stone v. Van Noy R. News Co., 153 Ky. 240, 154 S.W. 1092
(1913) which says a bottle is not inherently dangerous with Coca-Cola Bottling
Works v. Shelton, 214 Ky. 118, 282 S.W. 778 (1926) which says a bottle is
inherently dangerous.
29. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (Ct. App. 1916).
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the wheel of his automobile fell off. He brought a tort action
against the Buick Co. and the maker of the wheel. The suit was
allowed, and privity as a bar to a tort action was laid to rest in
New York. Cardozo said any product which if negligently made
could injure was dangerous; a known danger, he said, attendant
upon a known use made vigilance a duty. The case was quickly
and widely followed; today every jurisdiction allows a tort
action against the manufacturer regardless of lack of privity.
3 1
The MacPherson doctrine has been extended to afford recovery
to any foreseeable user of any product which injures because of
the maker's negligence.32
Privity lingered, however, to prevent an action in warranty.
Here it made more sense; here it was more at home. After all, a
31. Annot., 74 A.L.R. 2d 1111 (1960); Ford Motor Co. v. McDavid, 259 F.2d
261 (4th Cir. 1958). There seem to be two views on the meaning and result of
the MacPherson case: first, that the case (and the many that followed it)
enunciated another exception to the privity requirement in tort actions, i.e., if the
product, if negligently made, could injure, then it was "imminently" dangerous
and recovery would be allowed; second, that MacPherson dispensed with the
privity requirement in tort actions. The second view seems more reasonable.
Generally, the same result follows regardless of the view taken: under the first
view the plaintiff must show that the product was imminently dangerous in
order to recover; under the second view the plaintiff must show that the
defendant was negligent in the manufacture of the product. That the product
was "imminently" dangerous thus becomes another way of saying that the
defendant was negligent.
Justice Cardozo probably did not intend to state an "imminently" dangerous
exception in MacPherson:
Subtle distinctions are drawn by the defendant between things inherently
dangerous and things imminently dangerous, but the case does not turn
upon these verbal niceties. If danger was to be expected as reasonably cer-
tain, there was a duty of vigilance, and this whether you call the danger
inherent or imminent. [Emphasis added].
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (Ct. App. 1916).
Weight is given to the position that MacPherson abolished lack of privity as
a defense in tort actions by Justice Cardozo's statements:
The question to be determined is whether the defendant owed a duty of
care and vigilance to any one but the immediate purchaser .... If the
nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature
gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of
danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons
other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of
contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make
it carefully. [Emphasis added],
Id. at 384, 111 N.E. at 1053.
32. [W]here a product, negligently made, is placed on the market, under
circumstances where danger is to be foreseen, lack of privity is no defense.
17 Wyo. L.J. 111, 114 (1963);
The current trend is to enlarge the liability of the manufacturer to the
remote vendee to include any article which if negligently made . . . may
reasonably be anticipated to cause injury.
Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 327, 95 S.E.2d 601, 604 (1956).
[Vol. 17
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warranty is a contract, and a plaintiff must be a party to a con-
tract in order to sue on it. This reasoning coupled with the courts'
benign attitude toward budding industry enforced the privity
requirement.
However, the law has become more sophisticated since the
early 1900's and industry has become self-sufficient and less in
need of coddling by the courts.
Writers complained of the unfairness of disallowing an injured
plaintiff a cause of action against the manufacturer simply be-
cause the plaintiff had not purchased the product directly from
the manufacturer. Public sentiment was outraged in the area of
injury caused by food and related products. Gross adulteration
and mislabelling of food led the courts to declare food-caused
injury an exception to the privity requirement in the warranty
area.33 A person injured by unwholesome food could sue under
the new "exception" and recover against the manufacturer for
breach of the implied warranty of fitness even though he pur-
chased from a retailer.
34
Another noteworthy exception, mentioned in Odom, was first
stated in Baxter v. Ford.35 This case involved express representa-
tions contained in Ford's advertising pamphlets that the wind-
shield of the Ford automobile "would not fly or shatter under
the hardest impact." Relying on these representations plain-
tiff bought a Ford; later a small rock shattered the wind-
shield and caused plaintiff to lose his eye. The court upheld
the plaintiff's right of action in express warranty, based on the-
pamphlets, stating that the express representations were a prom-
ise to the consuming public and that Ford should be responsible
for failure to comply with the representations. The 'advertising
pamphlets, they said, had as their purpose the inducement of the
public to purchase, and it would be manifestly unfair to allow
Ford to make statements which plaintiff relied on to his harm
and then refuse plaintiff redress in warranty against Ford.
The privity requirement in warranty actions was thus being
whittled away by exceptions much as the defunct privity require-
ment in the tort area had been before.
33. 142 A.L.R. 1479 (1943) ; Dickerson, Recent Developments in Food Prod-
ucts Liability: Privity, 80 DEFENSE L.J. 105 (1960).
34. See generally Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773 (1961)
in which a warranty action was held maintainable by an infant who was hurt
while biting into pieces of salmon containing metal fish tag; the infant's father
had bought the salmon.
35. 168 Wash. 465, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
1965]
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The express warranty exception 0 and the food exception 37
have been generally accepted by the courts of this country. South
Carolina recognizes the food exception in its Pure Food and
Drug statute which makes the sale of adulterated food negligence
per se.38
Much of the confusion in this area of the law comes from the
failure to differentiate between contract and tort actions: some
courts cite negligence cases as support for the proposition that
privity should not be essential in warranty actions. The old
"inherently dangerous" exception which existed in the tort area
has been confused with the privity requirement in the contract
area, and it has been stated that such articles form an exception
to the privity requirement in implied warranty actions.39 This
statement has not been borne out by the cases. In fact, the nature
of the injury-causing product should have no relevance to the
problem of whether privity should be a requisite in a warranty
action. If a product can and does injure, its nature should have
no bearing on whether the injured party has a right to pursue a
warranty action. The difficulties in determining what products
were inherently dangerous were so great in the tort area that it
is fortunate the concept has not been imported into the contract
area.
The use of the word "warranty" has been an important factor
in the development of the law. Historically, a warranty action
first sounded in tort and was akin to the action in deceit, but
by custom and convenience it became associated with contract.40
Warranty actions were thus a curious hybrid of tort and contract
36. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181
N.E.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1962); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent, 167 Ohio St.
244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
37. See generally 1 Ponucrs LIABILITY §23.01[1][A] (1961); Annot., 142
A.L.R. 1479 (1943); RESTATEMIENT (SECOND), ToRTS §402A (Tent. Draft
no. 6,1961) states that 19 jurisdictions have accepted strict liability as to food;
5 (including South Carolina) have reached the same result under statutes; 13
states hold there is no liability in consumers in absence of negligence or privity
of contract; and 14 states have no definite law as to food.
38. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 32-1520 (1962), makes it unlawful to sell any article
of food which is adulterated or misbranded and imposes a fine or imprisonment
as punishment for violation of the section. However, there is some conflict in
the cases on whether violation of the statute is negligence per se, Gantt v.
Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 193 S.C. 51, 7 S.E.2d 641 (1940), or merely
prima facie evidence of negligence, Peters v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 224
S.C. 437, 79 S.E.2d 77 (1954); Note, Negligence Per Se in South Carolina:
The Effect Given in Civil Actions to the Violation of Criminal Statutes, 11
S,C.LQ. 207 (1959).
39. 77 C.J.S. Sales §305(b) n. 49 (1952).
40. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 195-197 (2d ed. 1924); Ames, History of As-
sumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1888).
[Vol. 17
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partaking of some aspects of both.41 Warranty gradually became
connected with contract in the minds of the bench and bar, and
this fact has hindered the acceptance of warranty liability as
strict tort liability.
The View of the New RESTATEmENT oF TORTS:
Strict Tort Liability
The proposed RESTATEmENT oF ToRTS4 2 imposes strict tort
liability on manufacturers of unreasonably dangerous products
which injure an ultimate consumer; it proposes a redefinition of
"warranty" as an obligation, not based in contract, the breach
of which renders the manufacturer strictly liable without the
need of proof of fault. In view of the importance of the section
and its wording it is included here:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property,
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the
seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product
and (b) it is expected to reach the user or consumer in the
condition in which it is sold. The rule . . . applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer
has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
In the note accompanying the section, the reporter says that
strict liability is quite evidently the law of the future, and that
with the exception of the change in the law with respect to pre-
natal injuries strict liability is the most radical and spectacular
development in tort law during this century. The reporter's com-
ments serve to explain the section so a summary of salient por-
tions follows.
The rule of strict liability stated in the section makes the seller
subject to liability to the user or consumer even though he has
used all care in the preparation of his product. The rule applies
to products which, if they are defective, may cause only physical
harm to the user's land or chattels. The rule does not apply to
41. For example, tort damages may be recovered but the contract statute of
limitations is applicable. The statute is generally considered to run from the
breach and not from the injury.
42. RESTATEMENT, (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft no. 10, 1964).
1965]
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the occasional seller who is not engaged in that activity as part
of his business, and does not apply to sales of stock of merchants
out of the usual course of business.
The rule applies only when the product is, at the time it leaves
the seller's hands, in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the ultimate consumer. The burden of proof that the
product was defective is on the injured plaintiff. A product is
not defective when it is safe for normal handling and consump-
tion. "Unreasonably dangerous" means that the article must be
dangerous beyond the extent contemplated by the ordinary
consumer.
The ultimate consumer or user may acquire the product
through one or more intermediate dealers. He need not have
purchased the product at all as he may be an employee, guest or
donee of the purchaser. "User" includes one who is presently
enjoying the benefits of the product as well as one who is doing
some work on it. The liability stated in section 402A does not
rest on negligence but is strict liability similar to absolute lia-
bility and has its basis purely in tort. To accord with section
402A, "warranty" must be given a new meaning very different
from the warranty found in the sale of goods and not subject
to the rules which govern such sales: (1) no reliance by the con-
sumer upon the seller's skill or judgement is required; (2) the
consumer is not required to give notice to the seller of his injury;
(3) the consumer's cause of action is not affected by any dis-
claimer and (4) the UNIFORM SALvs AcT and the U~soum
CorI~mnRcIL CODE are not at all applicable.
48
Section 402A had a rapid and dramatic development: in its
1960 form the section concerned liability of sellers of food;44
then in 1961 it was widened to concern sellers of products for
intimate bodily use ;45 and in 1964 it reached its present form.
This sequence reflects the extraordinary rapidity of change in
products liability law. For example, 75 A.L.R.2d contains an
annotation on this subject;46 since publication of that volume in
1961 eleven of the states it names as requiring privity have
abandoned the requirement.
47
43. Id. comments A-N.
44. RESTATEM.NT (SEcOND), TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft no. 6, 1961).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TCRTS § 402A (Tent. Draft no. 7, 1962).
46. Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1961).
47. Those states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
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Dispensing with Privity: New York and New Jersey
In 1958, two years after Odom, the first major case declared
privity not essential in an implied warranty action. This burst-
ing of the dam occurred in Michigan in the case of Spence v.
Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc.48 which was an
action against the manufacturer for commercial loss caused by
defective cinder blocks. The action was allowed, and after this
the cases came pell-mell: since Spence, eighteen jurisdictions
have dispensed with the privity requirement.4"
New York was a relative late comer, doing away with privity
in 1963 in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.50 Prior to
Goldberg there had been two important cases: Greenberg v.
Lorenz51 and Randy Knitwear v. American Cyanamid.52 The
first of these allowed the warranty action absent privity because
the injury had been caused by a food product; the second al-
lowed the action because of the manufacturer's express repre-
sentations on the labels in his products. The time was ripe for a
final blow to privity, and it came in Goldberg. Plaintiff's de-
ceased had been a passenger on an American Airline's flight
which crashed near La Guardia airport. Suit was brought in
tort against American Airlines, and in warranty and tort against
Lockheed (the manufacturer of the aircraft) and Kollsman In-
strument Corporation (the maker of the allegedly defective
altimeter). The New York court allowed the warranty action
against Lockheed but not against Kollsman, stating that Lock-
heed had the final duty to test all component parts and that
casting Lockheed in liability was sufficient protection for pas-
sengers "for the present at least.15 It may be recalled that Car-
dozo reached a similar result in MacPherson relative to the lia-
bility of the component part maker when he refused to hold the
maker of the wheel liable. Goldberg, which completed the evolu-
tion in New York and did away finally with privity, is clouded
by the fact that it is a four to three decision and contains a
stormy and powerful dissent by Judge Burke, who was reluctant
to displace the law of negligence from its ancestral environment
without legislative action. He saw fault as the basis of liability,
48. 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W2d 873 (1958).
49. See note 6, supra.
50. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1963).
51. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773 (Ct App. 1961).
52. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1962).
53. Goldberg v. KolIsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y2d 432, 434, 191 N.E.2d
81, 83 (Ct. App. 1963).
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and criticized the majority's choice of Lockheed as responsible
defendant:
Inherent in the question of strict products or enterprise
liability is the question of the proper enterprise on which
to fasten it. Here the majority have imposed this burden on
the assembler of the finished product, Lockheed. The prin-
ciple of selection stated is that the injured passenger needs
no more protection. We suggest that this approach to the
identification of an appropriate defendant does not answer
the question: Which enterprise should be selected if the
selection is to be in accord with the rationale upon which
the doctrine of strict products liability rests?
The purpose of such liability is not to regulate conduct
with a view to eliminating accidents,2 but rather to remove
the economic consequences from the victim who is unpre-
pared to bear them and place the risk on the enterprise in
the course of whose business they arise. The risk, it is said,
becomes part of the cost of doing business and can be effec-
tively distributed among the public through insurance or
by a direct reflection in the price of the goods or service.
As applied to this case we think that the enterprise to which
accidents such as the present are incident is the carriage
of passengers by air-American Airlines.
And in footnote two, Burke goes to the heart of the problem:
2. In view of the ease with which lack of care can be brought
to light through devices such as res ipsa loquitur, any mar-
ginal increase in the stimulus to care would be clearly out-
weighed by the harshness of the means used to achieve it-
the removal of due care as a defense.54
This dissent and the division of the court leave the state of the
law in New York in some doubt.
In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 55 New Jersey was faced
with the privity problem. The plaintiff was the wife of the pur-
chaser of an automobile; while she was driving, the steering
mechanism ceased to function properly, and she ran into a brick
wall. She brought an action against the retailer based on the
breach of an implied warranty to recover for the injuries she
sustained in the accident. The court, in a well-reasoned decision,
54. Id. at 435, 191 N.E.2d at 85.
55. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
[Vol. 17
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abandoned the privity requirement and affixed strict liability
on the defendant.56 The court could see no rational basis for
differentiating between a fly in a bottle of soda pop (for which
an action was allowed by way of the food exception) and a de-
fective steering mechanism. The Henningsen case is perhaps
destined to become the MacPherson of the warranty area and is
as valuable for its discussion of the disclaimer clause in the
contract of sale of a new automobile57 as it is for its discussion
of privity.
The New York and New Jersey approach, i.e. stripping war-
ranty of its illusory contract mask and declaring it strict tort
liability, seems direct and reasonable. Other courts, however,
have used various theories to allow recovery without going to
this extent, such as the idea that the warranty "runs with the
goods,""8 or that the contract of sale inures to the benefit of the
injured party,59 or that the warranty is assigned to the purchaser
from the retailer.60 One writer has collected twenty-nine theories
from the cases.61
The reasons for dispensing with privity are persuasive: the
manufacturer should stand behind his product; the man who
puts a defective product on the market should be held liable for
the consequences of that defect; society holds human life in high
56. Where commodities sold are such that if defectively manufactured they
will be dangerous . . . then society's interest can only be protected by
eliminating the privity requirement...
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 370, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960).
57. The disclaimer of warranty was on a standard printed purchase order of
the sort widely used by the Automobile Manufacturer's Association which is
composed of General Motors, Ford, Chrysler and others. On the back of the
order was the following:
It is expressly agreed that there are no warranties, express or implied,made by either the dealer or manufacturer ... except as follows: the
manufacturer warrants each vehicle to be free from defects in material and
workmanship under normal use .... Its obligation under this warranty
being limited to making good at its factory any part ... which shall with-
in 90 days . .. be returned to it with transportation charges prepaid and
which its examination shall disclose to its satisfaction to have been thus
defective.
Id. at 363, 161 A.2d at 74. The New Jersey court held the disclaimer ineffective:
An instinctively felt sense of injustice cries out at such a bargain.
Id. at 373, 161 A.2d at 84. A similar warranty was involved in Odom but Mr.
Justice Oxner did not discuss it as the jury had found that it had not been
brought to the plaintiff's attention.
58. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
59. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal.2d 277, 93 P.2d 799 (1939).
60. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90
S.W.2d 445 (1936).




McCravy: Odom v. Ford and the Privity Requirement in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons,
SouTH CAnOLIA LAW REViEW
regard and that interest demands that manufacturers indem-
nify the victims of their defective products; manufacturers are
best able, by virtue of their position, to bear the cost of strict
liability by raising the unit price of their consumer goods or
purchasing products liability insurance, thus preventing the
burden of injury from falling on the injured party alone. Justice
demands that the manufacturer be liable regardless of his free-
dom from fault. Furthermore, since the manufacturer's liability
can be enforced by a series of suits (purchaser against retailer,
then retailer against manufacturer) it is expedient to avoid such
a circuity of actions which cause needless cost to needless parties
by allowing a direct action by the injured purchaser against the
manufacturer. Against these compelling reasons stands the
naked, legal argument that a warranty is contractual and cannot
be sued on by a non-contracting party. This dry logic is not well-
received by a man crippled by a defective product which he
bought from a retailer who is not able to pay damages.
The conjecture, what will South Carolina do in the future,
is heightened by the fact that Odom was not a case of personal
injury but of commercial loss only. If faced with the Goldberg
or the Henningsen situation, will the South Carolina Supreme
Court consider itself bound by Odom or will it confine Odom to
its facts? The answer is not apparent. The language in Odom
is clear to the effect that privity is essential in an implied war-
ranty action, 2 but Odom could easily be considered to stand for
the proposition that privity is necessary for warranty actions
involving purely commercial loss. The court would then be free
to announce a new policy on the question of privity in actions in-
volving personal injury when such a case arises in this state.
It is desirable that South Carolina adopt the reasoning of the
New York and New Jersey courts on the privity matter. Strict
liability will very soon be the law in a majority of states and
may, in the future, be law in all the states. The inevitability of
strict liability is clear, and the only real question is when it will
be adopted.
62. We think it is clear . . . that any liability on the theory of implied war-
ranty is confined to [the retailer] and that an action on such a warranty
cannot be maintained against Ford with whom there was no privity of
contract.
Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 328, 95 S.E.2d 601, 605 (1955). It is
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Related Problems: Insurance, legislation, Uniform
Acts and Contributory Negligence.
Since the central problem in products liability cases is who
is to pay, and since it is arguable that the manufacturer should
have to pay, the question becomes one of where the money is to
come from. Insurance is the reasonable answer. Products lia-
bility insurance is still in relative infancy, but generally it pro-
vides coverage for injury caused by the insured's product during
the policy period. Policies are usually written for one year and
contain limits for each person injured, each accident caused by
the product, and for the total amount that will be paid during
the policy period. In such aspects as the duty of the insurer to
defend actions involving the insured's product and the duty of
the insured to co-operate, products liability is similar to other
liability insurance. 63 The critics of this scheme decry the advent
of "Products Compensation" patterned after workman's compen-
sation insurance.64
Some states have attempted to solve the privity problem by
legislation.65 Georgia, for example, enacted a statute6 holding
the manufacturer liable to the ultimate consumer which ap-
peared to dispense with privity. The Georgia court6 7 however,
interpreted "ultimate consumer" to mean purchaser and thus
retained the privity requirement to the extent that anyone not
a purchaser could not sue under the statute.
The U1nr'oRm SALEs ACT defines "buyer"68 and "seller" as
immediate buyer and seller and has been held to preclude a war-
63. See generally 2 PRODUCTs LiABmLTY §§ 50-52 (1961).
64. Freedman, Products Compensation: Who's Pushing Whom?, 20 Bus.
LAW 167, 168 (1964).
65. California enacted a statute apparently designed to eliminate the right of
recovery in implied warranty as to blood plasma. CAL ORNIA HEALTH AND
SAFETY CODE § 1623 (1955).
66. The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property ...
shall warrant the following to the ultimate consumer, who, however, must
exercise caution when purchasing to detect defects, and provided there
is no express covenant of warranty ... to the contrary: (1) the article
is merchantable and reasonably suited to the intended use ....
GA. CODE ANN. § 96-307.
67. Revlon v. Murdock, 103 Ga. 842, 120 S.E.2d 912 (1961). The plaintiff, a
beautician, was hurt when a bottle of nail polish exploded. The court said that
in view of the language of the statute, "consumer" meant purchaser.
68. "Buyer" means a person who buys or agrees to buy goods or any legal
successor in interest of such person.
UNn'oa SALEs AcT § 76(1).
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ranty action by one who does not buy from the defendant.6 9
The UNiron COrMEROIAL CODE. extends the retailer's warranty
to any natural person who is in the family or household of the
buyer or who is a guest in the buyer's home if it is reasonable to
expect that the person may use the goods."0 The Code does not
go further than this, and the question of the manufacturer's lia-
bility to the remote vendee is expressly left to the developing
case law."
1
It might be supposed that once the privity requirement is
abolished the defense of a products liability case becomes almost
impossible, but this is not true.72 The plaintiff must still show
causation and he must show that the defect existed in the prod-
uct when it left the defendant's hands. This is not an easy burden
of proof. Also, the defendant will presumably have some form
of the defense of assumption of risk available to him. Contribu-
tory negligence is not generally a defense to a warranty action"8
but assumption of risk, consisting of voluntarily and unreason-
ably proceeding to encounter a known danger, should be a de-
fense. In any case, a plaintiff who becomes aware of the dan-
gerous nature of the product he is using and continues to use
the product in defiance of the obvious danger to him should
clearly be barred of recovery. 4
Conlusion
As Judge Cardozo said in Ultramares v. Touclie, "The assault
upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace.""i5
However, since Dean Prosser has used that sentence in his ex-
69. In Hanback v. Dutch Baker Boy, 107 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1939), an
infant who was made ill by an unwholesome chocolate eclair purchased by the
infant's mother was denied an action for breach of implied warranty since the
infant was not a "buyer" or "successor in interest" of a buyer.
70. UNIFORM COMMERCAL CODE § 2-318.
71. Id. comment (3) A recent Pennsylvania case allowed an employee of a
hotel who was injured by a champagne cap (it blew out of the bottle and hit
him in the eye) to avail himself of the remedy afforded by § 2-318. Yentzer v.
Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964), 17 VAND. L. REv. 1537
(1964).
72. See generally Bushnell, Practical Aspects of Defending Products Liability
Cases, 11 DEFENsE L. J. 99 (1962).
73. See generally Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288
N.W. 309 (1939).
74. Unreasonable exposure to a known and appreciated risk should bar
recovery ....
I PnoDucrs LIABILITY § 16.01 [31 (1961).
75. 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (Ct. App. 1931).
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cellent article in the Yale Law JournaZ,78 this writer is precluded
from doing so, and is left to a more mundane termination.
The history of the privity requirement shows that it was ac-
cidentally introduced into the law to apply to both contract and
tort actions; that MacP herson dispensed with it in the tort
action; that many states including New York and New Jersey
have done away with privity in warranty actions; and that the
inevitable trend is towards a strict products liability sounding
in tort. "Warranty" is considered by the proposed RESTATEMNT
OF TORTS as a duty, devoid of contract implications, the breach
of which is afforded a remedy regardless of the lack of con-
tractual relation between the plaintiff and the defendant.
Odom v. Ford Motor Co. held that privity was requisite for
an implied warranty action, but Odom was not a personal injury
case. Due to the harshness of the privity requirement in war-
ranty actions and in light of the humanitarian reasons behind
dispensing with privity, it is very possible that the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court will confine Odom v. Ford to its facts, or
even overrule it, if faced with a case involving personal injury.
SaMtrm TucmR McCR&vr, III
76. 69 YA . L. J. 1099 (1960).
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